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iii

ARGUMENT
MSI/Alta's response to the restrictive covenant issue is notable for three things:
(1) its lack of legal authority for any of its principal arguments; (2) its lack of record
support for its factual premises; and (3) its direct contradiction of the governing
documents. Missing is any legal justification for the granting of summary judgment
against The View. The error perpetuated below should be corrected by this Court.
I.

THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS OPERATE BY THEIR TERMS TO
CONTROL AMENDED PLATS, NOT VICE VERSA.
A.

MSI/Alta's Argument Is Backward.

Boiling the argument down to its essence, MSI/Alta says amendment of the plat
rendered the restrictive covenant "inoperative and unenforceable." (Reply Br. at 13.)
MSI/Alta can find no authority for this proposition, either in the language of the
Restrictive Covenants or in the case law. In fact, this argument is exactly backward. The
restrictive parking covenant modifies the plat "as amended"; the plat as amended does
not modify the restrictive parking covenant. (Add. 34-35; R. 367-68.) Not, at least, if the
language of the Restrictive Covenants is respected.
MSI/Alta finesses this plain-language obstacle by repeatedly arguing that the
Amended Plat is "incorporated by reference" into the Restrictive Covenants. (Reply Br.
at 12, 13 & n.4.) But consider how they are. The Restrictive Covenants say they apply to
the plat and any amendment to the plat; they do not say, as MSI/Alta argues, that merely
amending the plat amends the substance of any underlying restrictive covenant. This
would render the terms of the Restrictive Covenants a nullity - especially the express
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amendment provisions - and thereby run afoul of core principles of contract
interpretation established in Utah law. See, e.g., Central Florida Investments v. Parkwest
Assocs., 2002 UT 3, Tf 12, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (contract construction should not nullify
express provisions); Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, t 11, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11
(restrictive covenants are contracts subject to all the rules of contract construction). The
court of appeals' conclusion is a decided anomaly in reported restrictive covenant
decisions.
B.

"Density" Does Not Equal "Use."

MSI/Alta dismisses the required written procedures for amending the Declaration
by arguing they "do not apply" to eliminating a substantive restrictive covenant. (Reply
Br. at 12.) MSI/Alta's rationale is that the Declarant reserved to itself the right to amend
the Declaration (and Plat, if necessary) to allocate density or to change the configuration,
size, or location of its lots. (Reply Br. at 12.) MSI/Alta's argument is a non sequitur for
two reasons. First, the Declarant never amended the Declaration as required by the very
language MSI/Alta relies upon. (Add. 79 § 13.2, R. 412, requiring amendment to "this
Declaration" as well as to "the Map, if necessary" for amendment to take effect; Add. 80
§ 13.4, R. 413, requiring a special Amendment Instrument acknowledged by the Board
and recorded with the County Recorder for amendment to take effect). Second, and more
importantly, the right reserved to the Declarant did not include the unilateral right to
eliminate substantive restrictive covenants.
In this regard MSI/Alta stretches the limiting language of the reservation clause
beyond recognition, announcing that allowing a different allocation of an established
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density is the equivalent of allowing a unilateral change of use. (Reply Br. at 12-13.)
MSI/Alta carries this argument to an extreme, referring first to the allowed change of
"density" as "density/use" and ultimately morphing it to "density and use." (Reply Br. at
13, 14 n.4, emphasis added.) This is absurd. MSI/Alta understandably cites no authority
for this proposition. But language and logic, as well as reasoned case law, demonstrate
that the distinction between density and use is a distinction with a difference. See, e.g.,
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary p. 339 (defining "density" as "quantity per . .
. unit area"); id. p. 1299 (defining "use" as "the legal enjoyment of property that consists
in its employment, occupation, exercise, or practice"); Ivancovich v. City of Tucson Bd. of
Adjustment, 529 P.2d 242, 248 (Ariz. App. 1974) (density regulations included in area
variance do "not affect the use of the land") (emphasis added); compare Declaration
Article III ("Use Restrictions") with § 2.15 ("Density") (Add. 42-46, 37; R. 375-79, 370).
MSI/Alta supports its position by parroting a hypothetical posed by the court of
appeals. (Reply Br. at 12-13.) In a footnote, the court of appeals rejected the plain
language of the Restrictive Covenants that applies the parking covenant to Lot 5 as
amended. (Ct. App. Op. Tf 28 n.l.) The court posited that, notwithstanding the
Declaration's requirements, Sorenson could have reconfigured the location or size of Lot
5 to make it wholly impractical as a parking designation. (Id.) The court suggested this
would technically comply with the contract while operating to deprive The View of the
benefits of the contract, thereby leading to an unacceptably absurd result. (Id.)
This unsupported hypothetical wholly ignores the duty of good faith inherent in
every contract. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-
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200 (Utah 1991). Any action to render an express restrictive covenant ineffective in this
manner would be an actionable breach. See id. at 200. Notably, there is no material
difference between the hypothetical the court of appeals posed and what MSI/Alta has
actually argued - that the restrictive parking covenant can be eliminated altogether by
unilateral action without regard to the benefits anticipated in the contract. By its own
analogy, the court of appeals demonstrates the need for the redress provided at law for the
violation of contractual provisions.
MSI/Alta's argument makes for bad contract law and policy. Under MSI/Alta5s
analysis the majority amendment procedures would never be implicated. Instead, any
substantive land restrictions could be unilaterally destroyed and amendment procedures
bypassed altogether simply by framing the action after the fact as a change in density
allocation or lot configuration, size, and location. Such an approach ignores the plain
meaning of the English language and the ordinary usage of land planning parlance.
The case law illustrates circumstances in which wholesale unilateral rights have
effectively been reserved to the declarant and properly invoked. See, e.g., Dyegard Land
Partnership v. Hoover, 39 S.W. 3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 2001) (reserving to Developer
"the right to alter or amend these restrictions," which it did in a written amendment); Rosi
v. McCoy, 356 S.E.2d 568, 569 (N.C. 1987) (reserving to Developers "the right to amend,
modify or vacate any restriction," which they did in a written amendment). Such
provisions were identified and discussed in The View's opening brief (pp. 39-40) and
unanswered by MSI/Alta. In contrast to those decisions, the Declarant's unilateral rights
in the instant case were specifically restricted to allow only limited changes that do not
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include eliminating substantive covenants. Consequently, those covenants remain in full
force and effect.
C.

This Court Does Not Recognize Implied Restrictive Covenants,

MSI/Alta's argument urges precisely what this Court's jurisprudence forbids: an
implied amendment to the Restrictive Covenants. See Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Ass Vi, 1999 UT 62, 987 P.2d 30. Dansie is directly on point. There has
been no written amendment to the Restrictive Covenants. Suggesting the Plat can do it,
as the court of appeals did, cannot be squared with the plain language of the Declaration.
The disconnect between the documents and the decision below is evidenced most
forcefully by MSI/Alta's statement that "the original parking covenant has no application
to the amended Lot 5." (Reply Br. at 14.) Juxtapose this argument against the language
of the covenants themselves providing the Restrictive Covenants apply to the plat as
amended. (Add. 33 § 1.13, 34 § 1.19, 35 § 1.25, 42 § 3.1; R. 366-68, 375.) The legal
error in the lower court's decision is self-evident.1
The View was and is entitled to rely on the plain language of the Restrictive
Covenants. MSI/Alta suggests that summary judgment in its favor is appropriate even
though the spin it puts on the construction of the Amended Plat on its face contradicts the

1

Despite protesting it is not making an implied amendment argument, MSI/Alta calls the
right to change the use of the lots an "inherent" right that appears, apparently, within the
penumbra of those rights actually listed. (Reply Br. at 12.) A non-explicit, "inherent"
right is an implied one. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 199 (interchangeably
using the terms "inheres" and "impliedly promises" when discussing implied covenant of
good faith).
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plain language of the Restrictive Covenants. MSI/Alta necessarily has to focus on
characterizing the Amended Plat to the exclusion of reading the Restrictive Covenants in
suggesting that The View could possibly have been put on notice about the implied
"amendment" to the Restrictive Covenants allegedly effected by a change of the map.
How the lower court could reach an implied amendment conclusion as a matter of law is
not explained. This is especially true when the Amended Plat itself does not state it is
eliminating or modifying any of the Restrictive Covenants but instead refers to the
"Master Declaration" as if its provisions remained in full force and effect. (See Add. 8687; see also infra part II, discussing more fully the actual content of the Amended Plat.)
Finally, MSI/Alta's unsupported statement that "[t]he material facts are not in
dispute" (Reply Br. at 1) is made without actually discussing the material record fact
disputes raised by MSI/Alta's motion and cited by The View in its opening brief at pages
30-31. If summary judgment for The View is not appropriate, these material disputes at
the least require denial of MSI/Alta's cross-motion. Under any appropriate view of the
record, judgment for MSI/Alta as a matter of law should be reversed.

II.

THE PARKING COVENANT UNEQUIVOCALLY RUNS WITH THE
LAND.
The Restrictive Covenants explicitly say in two places they run with the land.

(Add. 31, 79; R. 364, 412.) These provisions have not been amended. Moreover, there
has been no showing by clear and convincing evidence that they were set aside - let alone
any acknowledgment of this high standard.
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MSI/Alta suggests merely amending the plat caused covenants explicitly running
with the land to lose their effect. (Reply Br. at 15.) MSI/Alta cites absolutely no legal
authority for this proposition. This idea contradicts basic principles of restrictive
covenants in general and covenants running with the land in particular and finds no basis
in the jurisprudence of this or any other common law court.
MSI/Alta tries for the first time ever in this litigation to distinguish Flying
Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989), arguing that the
surface owner's payment right was not transferable and that the original obligor had not
agreed to terminate the covenants. (Reply Br. at 15.) The case does not turn on those
phantom distinctions and is not distinguishable on those bases. First, in Flying Diamond
the payment covenants were not transferable separate from the surface ownership
because they were covenants running with the land. See id. at 621. Second, the original
obligor (Newton & Sons Sheep Co.) could no more act in contravention of the covenant
than could its successor in interest (Newton Sheep Co.). See id. Flying Diamond is good
law that holds restrictive covenants remain in force notwithstanding futile efforts by one
or more parties to act in violation thereof.
Notably in the case at bar, the recording of the Amended Plat did not itself purport
to extinguish any Restrictive Covenant; but if it had, Flying Diamond teaches that such
efforts are ineffectual. On its face, the Amended Plat itself does no more than change the
2

Any argument attempting to distinguish Flying Diamond on this or any other basis was
waived below and should not be considered for the first time on appeal. (See footnote 7
to The View's opening brief, noting MSI/Alta's failure to raise or brief this issue below.)
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density of Lots 4 and 5 from 85 to 65 units and of Lots 8 and 9 from 40 units to 60.
(Add. 86.) There is no indication of noted density changes permanently eliminating any
use of Lot 5 (indeed the original plat, like the amended plat, spoke in terms of
"Anticipated Dwelling Density" and "Residential Units" when discussing density); of
significantly changing Lots 8 and 5; or of eliminating restrictive covenants. {Compare
Add. 86-87 with Add. 84-85.) To the contrary, the Declaration's density allocation
reservation still exists, as does the Amended Plat's reference to the Restrictive Covenants
as remaining viable going forward. (Add. 86-87.) Both the original and amended plats
maintain the density limit set forth in the Restrictive Covenants. (Add. 84-87.) If there is
any question about these issues, the record shows MSI represented to the Alta Town
Council that the alterations in the Amended Plat were "minor" and that the "units
allocated are essentially the same." (R. 504.) MSI/Alta has utterly failed at any time in
the course of this litigation to show by clear and convincing evidence that the parking
covenant "terminated" prior to conveyance of the land, as it now argues, let alone that it
do so as a matter of law.
Lastly, The View does not "concede" the notice ascribed to it by MSI/Alta.
(Reply Br. at 16 n.5.) MSI/Alta outright misrepresents The View's argument, which is
that The View had both actual and constructive notice of the unamended Restrictive
Covenants. (View Br. at 28.) The View's deed incorporates by reference the Restrictive
Covenants, including the restrictive parking covenant. Summary judgment against The
View cannot be sustained on such a record. See Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980, 982
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(Utah 1972) (holding summary judgment inappropriate when recitals in deed contradict
moving party's argument).
III.

THE "AMBIGUITY" ANALYSIS DESCRIBED BY MSI/ALTA IS
FLAWED.
MSI/Alta's proposition is an astounding one: that summary judgment

contradicting the plain language of restrictive covenants should be sustained. This Court
should reject that argument.
Both the View and MSI/Alta agree that the Restrictive Covenants are
unambiguous. Notwithstanding this agreement, the court of appeals held the Restrictive
Covenants were ambiguous. Either way, The View's position has always been that
summary judgment cannot be granted against The View when the plain language of the
Restrictive Covenants reads as it does.4
It is unclear what analysis MSI/Alta is employing. MSI/Alta argues that "no
ambiguity analysis is required," but simultaneously argues the effect of extrinsic
evidence. (Reply Br. at 16-18.) Even if extrinsic evidence were considered, however,
summary judgment is inappropriate.
To avoid any confusion, this Court should undertake a proper, de novo ambiguity
analysis under Utah law.

Notably, MSI/Alta never once addresses the controlling Judkins decision either in its
rogue opening brief or in its reply.
4
Despite MSI/Alta's feeble attempt at characterizations, The View has never argued this
contract is ambiguous. (Reply Br. at 16.)
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A. The Restrictive Covenants Are Unambiguous
The first step is to determine whether the Restrictive Covenants are ambiguous,
which is a legal determination for the Court. See Swenson, 2000 UT 16,1f 11, 998 P.2d
807, 810-11. If they are unambiguous, the Court construes them as a matter of law. See
id. Here, all parties agree there is no ambiguity. (View Br. at 34; MSI/Alta Opening Br.
at 30; Reply Br. at 16.) This should resolve the question. See J.M. Beals Enters., Inc. v.
Industrial Hard Chrome, Ltd., 551 N.E.2d 340, 342 (111. App. 1990) ("When parties agree
that the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, then construing the contract is a
matter of law appropriate for summary judgment.").5
"When parties disagree over the meaning of an unambiguous contract, the court
must determine the intent of the parties. This determination must be based upon the
objective intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and not their present
interpretation." Hutchings v. Chevron U.S.A., 862 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Tex. App. 1993)
(emphasis added); see also Seoane v. Drug Emporium, 457 S.E.2d 93, 96 (Va. 1995)
(court simply gives language its plain meaning when both parties agree contract language
is unambiguous). This should end the analysis with the Court pronouncing what the
contract means. Here, The View submits the contract means what it says.

5

Even if the Court were independently to analyze whether the Declaration is ambiguous,
it should reach the same result. The Court may look to any evidence inside or outside the
contract in making its ambiguity determination. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers
Ass 'n., 907 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995). Here, neither party points outside the contract to
argue ambiguity.

308224v. 1

10

If, on the other hand, the Court believes the Restrictive Covenants are ambiguous,
the analysis continues as a factual one.
B. If the Restrictive Covenants Are Ambiguous, the Issue Becomes a Jury
Question.
If the Restrictive Covenants are ambiguous, the jury resolves the issue. See
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488
(Utah 1986); WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d
1139, 1145. The Court may not take this determination away from a jury when evidence
supports the non-moving party's factual interpretation. See, e.g., Smith v. Four Corners
Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, f 40, 70 P.3d 904, 915.
Assuming, arguendo, a factual analysis is appropriate, the court of appeals erred
by holding the extrinsic evidence does not raise a factual dispute.6 The View's evidence
has been laid out in detail for the Court on pages 30-31 of The View's opening brief. It
includes the fact no written amendment was ever made to the Restrictive Covenants as
called for by the contract itself. This is a significant piece of evidence that of itself may
be dispositive. See, e.g., Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 164 (Utah
App. 1990) (if parties intended result, they could have said so in their contract); cf
Dyegard Land Partnership, 39 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 2001) (amending restrictive
covenants with written amendment pursuant to terms of covenants); Rosi v. McCoy, 356
6

The court below observed that The View did not adduce any "testimony" to rebut Mr.
Plumb's testimony of Sorenson's intent. (Ct. App. Op. If 26.) This is true but irrelevant.
MSI/Alta restates this proposition to say The View presented no "evidence." (Reply Br.
at 18.) As shown in the text, this clearly is not true.
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S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 1987) (same). Moreover, The View's deed incorporated the
unamended Restrictive Covenants as applied to the Amended Plat. (R. 417-18.) And the
Amended Plat itself refers to the ongoing viability of the Restrictive Covenants. (Add.
87.) These are significant, if not dispositive, facts from which a jury could find for The
View under a factual analysis. MSI/Alta ignores these and other disputed facts
altogether, labeling them as "immaterial" or as "legal conclusions." (Reply Br. at 19
n.6.) MSI/Alta provides no support for its conclusory description of The View's material
facts and obviously has no answer for them. (Reply Br. at 19 n.6.) This Court can see
them for the material facts they are.
When such facts are considered in the light most favorable to The View - and
further in light of the circumstances under which MSI/Alta obtained Walter Plumb's
testimony - Mr. Plumb's credibility also becomes an important issue. This is wholly
appropriate on summary judgment, especially when objective evidence shows reasons to
question his credibility. See, e.g., Powell v. Viking Ins. Co., 722 P.2d 1343 (Wash. 1986)
(summary judgment not properly granted when credibility issues exist involving more
than collateral matters); see also State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)
(reviewing court may even reassess credibility when testimony inherently improbable).
Summary judgment cannot properly be granted against The View on this record.

7

The Affidavit of Russell Watts, argued by MSI/Alta, was submitted for the first time in
reply in the summary judgment proceedings and should not be considered. (See footnote
9 on page 31 of The View's opening brief, discussing this point in detail.)
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IV.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE VIEW NEVER "ABANDONED" ITS
RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE RESTRICTIVE PARKING COVENANT.
MSI/Alta's last argument is full of unsupported assertions. MSI/Alta provides no

record support - and there is none - for the following primary assertions it makes: (1)
that the parking covenant was "forgotten" for fifteen years; (2) that the parking covenant
"has been continuously violated for fifteen years"; (3) that "no owner from any lot has
sought enforcement of the covenant until now"; (4) that The View has "sufficient
parking" on its lot; and (5) that a central parking facility on Lot 5 has become
"unnecessary." (Reply Br. at 19-20.) The Court should disregard these bald assertions.
See Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2005 UT 98, Tf 21, 104 P.3d 1208, 1213 (declining to
consider factual assertions unsupported by the record or not properly cited).
MSI/Alta's legal argument on this point is likewise unsupported: MSI/Alta cites
no decisional law backing up its conclusions. (Reply Br. at 19, 20 n.7.) There is no case
law authority for the proposition that non-enforcement of a covenant based on lack of
need for enforcement is the analytical equivalent of a repeated violation. Indeed, this
idea runs directly contrary to the case law. See, e.g., Thayer v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 787,
789 (Wash. App. 1984).
MSI/Alta also misconstrues the documents. The documents do not say, and The
View is not arguing, that either MSI or Alta has an "affirmative duty" to "construct a
parking facility on Lot 5." (Reply Br. at 20 n.7.) Restrictive covenants are just that: they
restrict the use of land. When MSI/Alta proceeded with a use of Lot 5 inconsistent with
the Restrictive Covenants, The View commenced suit in response. The law is clear that
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the passage of time in and of itself does not make the covenant go away. See Thayer, 611
P.2d at 789. If there is any doubt about this, the Restrictive Covenants themselves
provide an explicit duration of 50 years. (Add. 79 § 12.12; R. 412.) As with all other
aspects of this case, MSI/Alta would rather the Court not read the Restrictive Covenants
themselves. But they comprise the controlling provisions.
MSI/Alta also argues that it is no longer possible to realize to a substantial degree
the benefits intended through the restrictive covenant. It is hard to see how MSI/Alta can
make this brand new argument in good faith. There is clearly no record support for it.
The View anticipates receiving the salient benefit of its bargain in this subdivision as
promised by the Sugarplum Declaration. It has appealed to this Court in an effort to
secure the rights it purchased. See, e.g., Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App 201, f 4,
71, P.3d 188, 192 (parties entitled to benefit of their bargain).
Finally, both the Swenson and Fink decisions demonstrate how far off base
MSI/Alta's abandonment argument really is. See Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, 998
P.2d 807; Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1995). In both of those cases, there
were repeated direct violations of the restrictive covenant. After these had taken place
over many years, the plaintiffs tried to enforce the covenants at issue. The courts in each
of those cases had no problem determining that the covenants had been abandoned. That
is simply not the case here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for those set forth in The View's opening brief and
in the record as a whole, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision refusing
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to enforce the unambiguous Restrictive Covenants encumbering Lot 5 of the Sugarplum
o

Subdivision in Alta.
,th

DATED this 4m day of April, 2005.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

By:
Robert E. Mansfield
Stephen K. Christiansen
Attorneys for Plaintiff Cross-Petitioner, and
Respondent The View Condominium Owners
Association

The View has neither renewed its prior motion to strike nor continued to argue matters
previously settled. (Reply Br. at 20 n.8.) The View has asked the Court to provide
guidance to other appellate litigants and their counsel so that double-briefing issues on
cross-petitions does not become the norm in this Court - which it will if the improper
practice exploited in this case is not curbed. The mere fortuity of one party obtaining the
"Petitioner" designation by filing a certiorari request a few minutes before a "CrossPetitioner" should not bestow an unfair procedural advantage by allowing an extra brief.
MSI/Alta's case law citations have no bearing on this point.
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Merrill F. Nelson
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60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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